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The Interplay of Product Definition,
Design and Trade Dress
Daniel J. Gifford*
In the present Essay, I discuss some of the roles played by
trademark law in stimulating competition among producers to
develop new varieties of products and services. I argue that
trademarks perform a particularly useful role in engendering
innovation, and that this role was, for a time, threatened by the
particular approach to genericity followed by the Ninth Circuit
in its well-known Anti-Monopoly' decisions. I also argue that
the developing law of trade dress performs a different, but
nonetheless complementary, role in encouraging innovation.
A trademark is, and has always been understood as, an in-
dicator of source.2 The effects of this source indication role,
however, have broadened as the economy has grown from the
simple producer-driven stage of the late nineteenth century to
the complex consumer-driven stage of the late twentieth cen-
tury. Today, the market provides an abundance of product var-
iations catering to increasingly differentiated tastes. It is
widely recognized that the prospect of capturing a significant
part of the economic value of an innovation or creative work
provides an important stimulus for effort and expense incurred
in its discovery or creation. Both the patent and copyright laws
are designed to encourage innovative and creative activity by
conferring upon inventors and authors the exclusive rights to
exploit their works commercially for a term of years.3 I argue
* Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Professor of Law, University of Min-
nesota. I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Robert C. Denicola for
his helpful comments on a draft of this article.
1. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316
(9th Cir. 1982), cert denied sub nom.. CFG Prods. Corp. v. Anti-Monopoly, Inc.,
459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611
F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979).
2. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918);
Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1990). See also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (1988) (trademark indicates source of product).
3. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)
(patent law); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539, 546 (1985) (copyright law).
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below that trademark law performs an analogous role in en-
couraging business firms to develop new product varieties.
I. PRODUCT INNOVATION AND THE ISSUE OF
GENERICITY
A. SOURCE INDICATION AND THE ANTI-MONOPOLY CASE
The classic understanding of a trademark is that which in-
dicates source. In Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,4 this un-
derstanding was embodied in the statement that a trademark
was a symbol whose "primary significance ... in the minds of
the consuming public is not the product but the producer."'5 In
Kellogg, the National Biscuit Company (NBC), which had pro-
duced a breakfast cereal known as Shredded Wheat, attempted
to stop Kellogg from applying that term to its own brand of
breakfast cereal. NBC contended that the term "Shredded
Wheat" had come to be associated with cereal produced by
NBC, so that its use by Kellogg to describe the latter's cereal
was deceptive. 6 NBC's case was complicated, however, by the
fact that, because of a patent on the process for making it, NBC
and its predecessors for many years had been the only produ-
cers of shredded wheat. In those circumstances, the term came
to identify both the product and the producer. Influenced by
the effects of NBC's long patent monopoly, the Court ruled
that when a patent expires and the right to produce becomes
public, so does the name of the product protected by the pat-
ent.7 Kellogg thus prevailed on the ground that the term
"Shredded Wheat" was a generic term that described both
NBC's and Kellogg's cereal.
More recently, in its Anti-Monopoly8 decisions, the Ninth
Circuit construed the Kellogg formation - that the primary sig-
nificance of a mark must be the source rather than the product
- to threaten the operation of trademark law as a stimulus to
product innovation. General Mills for many years had mar-
keted the real estate board game known as Monopoly and had
registered "Monopoly" as a trademark under the Lanham Act.9
4. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
5. Id. at 118.
6. Id. at 113-15.
7. Id at 118.
8. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316
(9th Cir. 1982) (Anti-Monopoly H), cert. denied sub nom CFG Prods. Corp. v.
Anti-Monopoly, Inc., 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills
Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979) (Anti-Monopoly I).
9. See Anti-Monopoly I, 611 F.2d at 299.
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When a board game (whose subject matter was the Sherman
and Clayton Acts) was marketed as Anti-Monopoly, General
Mills challenged the latter term as an infringement of its "Mo-
nopoly" trademark. Anti-Monopoly then sought a declaratory
judgment that General Mills's mark was invalid and not in-
fringed.10 Although General Mills prevailed twice in district
court, both judgments were reversed by the Ninth Circuit,
which ruled that "Monopoly" was a generic term and as such
unprotectable by the trademark law.11
The Ninth Circuit derived its ruling that "Monopoly" was
generic from the Kellogg formulation that the primary signifi-
cance of the mark must be the source rather than the prod-
uct.12 As the name of a well-known board game produced by
General Mills's Parker Brothers division, the term "Monopoly"
referred both to the game itself and to the producer. This
double reference is a common aspect of trademarks. The term
"Ford" can apply both to a particular automobile as well as to
its manufacturer; the term "Marlboro" refers to a cigarette and
also indicates its source. The double reference of the trade-
mark in the Anti-Monopoly case was the root of the court's
problematic ruling.
Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a large pro-
portion of the public associated "Monopoly" with Parker Broth-
ers, that court apparently believed that if more people used the
term to identify the game than to identify the producer, the
term lost its status as a trademark and became a generic term.'3
The principal proof offered to show that more people used the
term in the product identification sense was a "motivation" sur-
vey introduced by Anti-Monopoly. In the motivation survey,
recent or prospective purchasers of Parker Brothers's Monop-
oly game were asked to select which of two statements best ex-
pressed their reasons: "Sixty-five percent chose: 'I want a
"Monopoly" game primarily became I am interested in playing
"Monopoly," I don't much care who makes it.' Thirty-two per-
cent chose: 'I would like Parker Brothers' "Monopoly" game
because I like Parker Brothers' product.' "14 Largely on the ba-
sis of that survey, the court ruled that the primary significance
10. I& at 300.
11. Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1326; Anti-Monopoly I, 611 F.2d at 306.
12. See Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1319; Anti-Monopoly I, 611 F.2d at
302.
13. Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1322-23, 1325.
14. Id at 1324.
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of the mark was the product. 15 Indeed, the court emphasized
its acceptance of the motivation survey approach in its reaction
to a motivation survey involving the Proctor & Gamble deter-
gent Tide, introduced by General Mills to illustrate the flaws of
a motivation survey.16
In its Tide survey, General Mills introduced a similarly
structured motivation survey measuring consumer attitudes to-
wards Tide, a popular detergent manufactured by Proctor &
Gamble. In the Tide survey, "when asked 'Would you buy Tide
primarily because you like Proctor & Gamble products, or pri-
marily because you like Tide detergent?' about 68% indicated
the latter reason."'17 In introducing the Tide survey, General
Mills had sought to demonstrate the absurd consequences to
which the logic of the motivation survey would lead. The court,
however, did not perceive the consequences as absurd. It in-
stead hinted that the Tide survey indicated that Proctor &
Gamble's trademark might itself be vulnerable to challenge.' 8
The business community was troubled deeply by the Ninth
Circuit's Anti-Monopoly decisions, because the rationale of
those decisions carried the potential for invalidating large num-
bers of trademarks. Although General Mills failed to persuade
the Supreme Court to take the case for review, Congress ulti-
mately repudiated the Anti-Monopoly decisions by enacting leg-
islation.19 That legislation expressly prohibited the use of a
motivation criterion for determining the primary significance of
a trademark.20
B. TRADEMARKS AND DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS
1. Trademarks as Identifiers of Packages of Product
Characteristics
The problematic aspect of the Anti-Monopoly decisions
went to the core of trademark law as it operates in an advanced
modern economy. In such an economy, trademarks, in per-
forming their traditional role as indicators of source, also help
to stimulate competition among producers in bringing new
product varieties to market. The wide choices of product char-
15. Id. at 1324-26.
16. Id. at 1326.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat.
3335 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064, 1127 (1988)).
20. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(c), 1127 (1988).
[Vol. 75:769
TRADEMARK LAW
acteristics available to the public are thus attributable in sub-
stantial part to the role played by trademarks in providing a
means for identifying each product variation: Each producer
tries to offer a package of product characteristics that appeals
to a segment of the buying public, and identifies the particular
package of product characteristics that it offers by its
trademark.
General Mills and Proctor & Gamble each provided, in
their respective markets of games and detergents, a product va-
riation, and each identified its own product variation with an
identifying name as a trademark. I initially shall use Proctor &
Gamble's Tide for illustrative purposes. Proctor & Gamble se-
lected a package of characteristics that it believed would appeal
to detergent users and identified its package with the "Tide"
trademark. Tide competes with other detergents possessing
their own combinations of product characteristics that are each
identified with their own respective marks. Purchasers use the
marks to identify the particular packages of product character-
istics that best meets their needs. The public rewards those
packages of product characteristics that it finds most satisfying
by increased purchases.
2. The Relation between Trademarks and Information
Scarcity
This description of the operation of trademarks evoking
new product variations, however, is not yet complete. The rea-
son that buyers need the information about producer identity
provided by trademarks is related to a pervasive condition in
which buyers possess only general and incomplete information
about the product itself. Moreover, even in those cases in
which buyers might possess complete information about a prod-
uct, many of them would be unable to articulate it precisely,
and therefore would be unable to query sellers of rival products
as to the relevant characteristics or composition of these rival
products.
Purchasers, however carefully and thoroughly they investi-
gate, are rarely familiar with every detail of a product. They
often do rely, however, upon a trademark as an indicator of
source because they have come to associate that source with a
given level of quality. The typical patron of a McDonald's res-
taurant has not inspected the meat or other ingredients, but he
takes the McDonald's trademark as an indicator of a composite
of service, all of the details of which he may not be able to re-
1991]
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cite, but with which he is, in varying degrees, familiar by rea-
son of reputation or prior experience. The purchaser of Tide
detergent may not be able to verbalize each of the product
characteristics that she has found satisfactory in the aggregate,
much less to identify its chemical components. She uses the
trademark "Tide" as a means of identifying the package of
product characteristics that is Proctor & Gamble's entry into
the detergent market, and she purchases Tide because she be-
lieves (on the basis of reputation or experience) that this pack-
age of characteristics will be satisfactory.
The means by which trademarks assist buyers to select sat-
isfactory product variations involves a two-step process: First,
trademarks enable buyers to identify packages of product char-
acteristics that they have purchased previously or know of by
reputation. Second, by identifying source, trademarks enable
buyers to rely upon that source as a guarantor of quality, thus
overcoming their own lack of complete information about the
product variation's composition and about its entire range of
characteristics. In performing this assistance to buyers, trade-
marks stimulate producers to develop product variations that
buyers find attractive.
3. The Ninth Circuit's Erroneous Approach
In Anti-Monopoly II, the Ninth Circuit correctly under-
stood that Parker Brothers and Proctor & Gamble used their
respective trademarks to identify their particular product varia-
tions;21 its error occurred in equating a term that identifies a
package of product characteristics with a generic term.22 Its
reasoning process, though ultimately in error, carried a certain
plausibility: Any product that was identical to Parker
Brother's game would be a Monopoly game; it would have to be
a Monopoly game because the term "Monopoly" identified
those product characteristics. Any detergent that possessed ex-
actly the characteristics of Tide would be Tide detergent, be-
cause the term "Tide" identified those characteristics. Indeed,
the assumptions that two products possessing identical charac-
21. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d
1316, 1323, 1326 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied sub nom. CFG Prods. Corp. v.
Anti-Monopoly, Inc., 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
22. Id. See also Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611
F.2d 296, 303 (9th Cir. 1979) ("When, in the consumers' minds, the characteris-
tics which distinguish a particular product are no longer primarily source par-
ticular, that product becomes its own genus, and its name becomes a generic
name.").
[Vol. 75:769
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teristics should be called by the same name underlay the moti-
vation surveys.23 The question that asked whether the
respondents would buy "Monopoly" or "Tide" regardless of
who made them assumes that identical games and detergents
are being offered for sale by several firms in the game and de-
tergent markets.
There are two flaws in this reasoning process: It ignores
the relation between trademarks and information; and it fails
to account for the role of trademarks in stimulating competi-
tion among producers in providing new combinations of product
characteristics.
To say that another detergent is Tide detergent because it
possesses the same characteristics as Proctor & Gamble's Tide
is to shortcut the role that trademarks play as an indicator of
source, and through source, of quality. What is the criterion for
saying another detergent possesses the "same" characteristics?
Suppose it is composed of a different chemical structure but is
designed to produce similar characteristics. Is it the same?
Suppose the different chemicals deteriorate more rapidly than
those used by Proctor & Gamble. Is the product still the same?
Even if the product is produced with the same chemicals, does
it make a difference that those used by the second producer are
less pure? Is a real estate board game that is similar to Monop-
oly, but not exactly the same, properly called "Monopoly"?
How much variation is acceptable?
Assume that a shopper has become familiar with Tide as a
detergent and likes it. That shopper now wants to purchase an-
other box of Tide. Will the shopper be aided or impeded if
companies other than Proctor & Gamble may market a deter-
gent under the name of "Tide"? That person will be impeded if
the non-Proctor & Gamble detergents differ in any respect rel-
evant to this purchaser. Moreover, differences irrelevant to
this buyer may be relevant to other buyers. A rule permitting
producers other than Proctor & Gamble to apply that term to
detergents possessing "identical" product characteristics ob-
scures the critical issues of how identity is to be established and
what the criteria for identity are.
The other weakness in the Ninth Circuit's approach is its
failure to consider the role of trademarks in encouraging pro-
ducers to develop new product variations. As indicated, the
ability of a producer to identify its own package of product
23. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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characteristics to buyers enables the buyers to purchase those
packages of characteristics they find pleasing, and enables pro-
ducers to capture some of the economic value they have cre-
ated. In so doing, producers are stimulated to bring new and
innovative packages of product characteristics to market. That
stimuls would vanish if the law were to convert any trade-
mark that served to identify a package of product characteris-
tics into an unprotectable generic term.
4. Communicating About Product Characteristics
As argued above, to say that a producer of a detergent with
characteristics like Tide should be entitled to call its product
"Tide" obscures the important matters involved in determining
similarity or identity. A producer, however, is fully entitled to
refer to another's trademark, such as "Tide," to communicate
information about its own product. A rival who believed that
its own version of a detergent possessed characteristics similar
or identical to Tide is free to so assert, provided the claim is
truthful. By promoting its own variation as possessing charac-
teristics similar or identical to those of Tide, the rival producer
informs buyers of its claims and provides them with the oppor-
tunity to evaluate those claims.
For purpose of communicating essential information to
buyers, therefore, there is no need for Proctor & Gamble's
trademark to be converted into a generic term. Any informa-
tional content that the mark "Tide" conveys about product
characteristics can be conveyed by making a reference to Tide;
direct application of that term is unnecessary and carries poten-
tial for confusion.
There is, however, a view - perhaps underlying the Ninth
Circuit's approach - that holds that consumers benefit when
rival producers are able to apply Proctor & Gamble's trade-
mark to their own copies of Tide detergent. The proponents of
that view would argue that making the term "Tide" available to
producers of copies facilitates communication to consumers. If
the copies are sufficiently similar to Proctor & Gamble's Tide,
then consumers are most effectively informed about the simi-
larity or equivalence when the rival producers use the term
that has come to connote to consumers the particular package
of characteristics possessed by Proctor & Gamble's Tide.
This view, however, necessarily suffers from defects af-
flicting the Ninth Circuit's approach because it itself embodies
that approach. It also suffers from a paternalism that underlies
[Vol. 75:769
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the Ninth Circuit's approach, a flaw the court did not make ex-
plicit. In this variation, as I have described it, the paternalism
is explicit. Rival producers are able fully to communicate to
consumers their claims concerning the equivalence between
their copies and Tide. By asserting that consumers can more
effectively be informed by allowing the rival producers to apply
the term "Tide" directly to their copies, the proponents imply
that consumers are incapable of evaluating these claims of
equivalence. Indeed, the contention is necessarily that an insti-
tution (such as the courts) can and should decide the equiva-
lence question for consumers.
C. PATENTS AND PRODUCT DEFINITION
The Ninth Circuit's decisions in the Anti-Monopoly case in-
corporated its own confusion over genus and species into its ap-
proach to determining when a term becomes generic. Rather
than examining the functions of trademark law in enabling
producers to identify their packages of product characteristics
to buyers and in stimulating new product variations, the court
took a sterile and nonfunctional approach to defining generic-
ity: Any product possessing similar or identical characteristics
belongs to the same genus and therefore is properly called by
the same term.2 As observed, this approach effectively would
destroy the incentive of producers to develop innovative prod-
uct variations.
A functional approach is useful in comparing the seminal
case of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.2 with the Anti-Mo-
nopoly case. During the time that NBC was the sole producer
of Shredded Wheat, it held a patent on the product and on the
process of making it.2 6 That patent - and others on machinery
for making Shredded Wheat - gave NBC exclusive control
over that product during the term of the pitent. When the pat-
ents expired, everyone who desired to do so became entitled to
produce Shredded Wheat. Because the product entered the
public domain, so did the name by which the product was
known. The Court ruled accordingly.27
When a patent is involved, a product is often defined by
that patent. In these circumstances, the description of the
24. See Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1323, 1326; Anti-Monopoly I, 611 F.2d
at 303.
25. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
26. 305 U.S. at 117.
27. IM at 118.
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product is likely to be unambiguous. The patented product and
term used to describe the patented product during the life of
the patent are coextensive. The scope of patent coverage will
indicate the denotation of the term. The patent, in other
words, creates the product genus. This was the case in Kellogg.
Because Kellogg would have infringed NBC's patent had it pro-
duced its version of Shredded Wheat during the patent period,
Kellogg's product is aptly described by that term. Moreover, it
is the patent law that has stimulated the development of that
product. The name by which the patented product is known is
necessarily a generic term: That term applies to a "product"
that, because it is patented, belongs to everyone as soon as the
period of legal monopoly expires.
Ironically, such an argument was potentially available in
the Anti-Monopoly case. Parker Brothers had held a patent on
its Monopoly game, which had expired in 1952.28 As in Kellogg,
the argument in the Anti-Monopoly case would be that the pat-
ent defined the game and that, with the expiration of the pat-
ent, the term used to describe the patented product passed into
the public domain. The Ninth Circuit, however, took a differ-
ent tack towards genericity: It employed the now infamous
"motivation survey" approach that threatened the underpin-
nings of trademark as a generator of product diversity.9
In the case of product variations, the development stimulus
comes from trademark law, not patent law. A producer is en-
couraged to come forward with a new combination of product
characteristics by the prospect that it can identify that combina-
tion to prospective buyers with its trademark. If the product
meets with buyer approval, sales will grow and the producer
will profit from its effort in developing the new product varia-
tion. Here, the term by which the product variation developed
by a particular producer is known identifies its source. The de-
tails of the product variation's construction and characteristics
are not described in a government document as in the case of a
patent; rather, the bundle of characteristics that constitutes the
product variation is identified primarily through its trademark
(and, accordingly, its explicit or implicit reference to source).
Rivals are free to imitate or improve upon any product va-
riation, and they are free to use the trademarks of other produ-
cers as references for asserting equivalence or improvement.
Because there is no official genus, there is no official test of
28. Anti-Monopoly I, 611 F.2d at 299.
29. See supra notes 12-20, 22-24 and accompanying text.
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equivalence. Each offering of a product variation is therefore
entitled to be known by its own name, a name that in these cir-
cumstances necessarily is an indicator of source. Information
about source is in effect part of the description of the product
variation.
II. TRADE DRESS AND THE PROTECTION OF
PRODUCT DESIGN
A. THE SCOPE OF THE TRADE DRESS DOCTRINE
The role trademark law plays in stimulating the develop-
ment of new product variations has been broadened and, as I
will demonstrate, complemented by developments in that area
of trademark law known as trade dress. The Seventh Circuit
recently described the scope of trade dress as follows: "A prod-
uct's trade dress is the overall image used to present it to pur-
chasers; it could thus include, to give a partial list, the product's
size, shape, color, graphics, packaging, and label."30
Trade dress protection has existed for decades; 31 recent
years, however, have seen an exponential growth in trade dress
case law. Recent court decisions afford protection to the design
of a building where a service is sold, to the design of containers,
and, as will be shown, increasingly to the design of the product
itself. Mogen David wine,32 Fotomat kiosks,33 spray gun
containers,4 fishing reel design,35 and the ambience of restau-
rants36 have been held protectable either directly as trade-
marks or under the aegis of the trade dress doctrine.
The cases have discussed trade dress in the traditional
30. Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 n.2 (7th Cir.
1987).
31. See, e.g., Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Products Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 257-
58 (2d Cir. 1962) (recognizing trade dress protection of "first comer's" product
against likelihood of consumer confusion created by "second comer's" prod-
uct); H.E. Winterton Gum Co. v. Autosales Gum & Chocolate Co., 211 F. 612,
616 (6th Cir. 1914) (holding that the distinctive "dress" of plaintiff's product,
known to the public as characterizing the product, was "entitled to protection
against unfair competition").
32. Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A.
1964).
33. Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D. Kan. 1977).
34. In re Morton-Norwich Prod., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1341-43 (C.C.P.A.
1982).
35. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517-20 (10th Cir.
1987).
36. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir.
1987).
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terms of trademark law. Trade dress is generally conceived as
more amorphous than a trademark, because trade dress can in-
clude packaging and design, whereas most trademarks are logos
or symbols. The trade dress cases, however, have provided pro-
tection on the traditional rationale that the packaging or design
identifies the source of the product and therefore performs the
role of a trademark.
As the trade dress doctrine has expanded its coverage, it
now provides protection to "the overall image used to present
[a product] to its purchasers." 37 In a world of almost unlimited
choice, buyers' purchases increasingly reflect much more than
the utilitarian aspects of the goods and services; products and
services are purchased for their image and aesthetics as well as
their performance; indeed, the image often blends into the
product or service. The result is that protection is increasingly
accorded to constituent parts of the product or service sold. In
many cases, the protected element is the product's design.-
Brunswick Corporation thus has been able to protect the design
of a fishing reel,39 and Schwinn has sought, with at least partial
success, to protect the design of an exercise bicycle.40 Fud-
druckers, an "upscale" hamburger restaurant chain, has been
similarly successful in its attempts to protect the overall design
of its restaurant from imitators;41 the ambience of the restau-
rant is protected and forms a part of the service that the cus-
tomer purchases.
B. AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY AS A LIMITATION ON TRADE
DRESS PROTECTION
Although a seller may obtain trademark or trade dress pro-
tection for the design of a container or even of the product it-
37. Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 n.2 (7th Cir.
1987).
38. See, e.g., LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir.
1985) ("Most trade dress infringement actions involve the packaging or label-
ing of goods.... Recently, however, we have recognized that the design of a
product itself may function as its packaging, serving to distinguish it from
other products, and hence be protectable under § 43(a)"). See also San Fran-
cisco Mercantile Co. v. Beeba's Creations, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (C.D.
Cal. 1988) (noting LeSportsac court's more expansive standard).
39. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517-20 (10th Cir.
1987).
40. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1178, 1188-91
(7th Cir. 1989).
41. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842-43 (9th
Cir. 1987).
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self, that protection is limited by the so-called "functionality"
doctrine. A design is functional in the trademark/trade dress
context - and hence unprotectable - if the design itself con-
fers competitive advantages upon its user. Thus, if the design is
significantly less costly to produce than alternatives, or if the
design performs its function in a markedly superior way to al-
ternative designs, then it is unprotectable. A design that is
merely functional in the sense that it performs an intended
utilitarian function, but not significantly better than alternative
designs, is protectable. Such a design is sometimes referred to
as functional in a de facto, but not de jure sense.
As the law has become more active in protecting product
designs, the issue of de jure functionality - which limits pro-
tectability - naturally increases in importance. Although the
law is clear enough on what constitutes functionality in a utili-
tarian sense, the law is somewhat less clear on what constitutes
aesthetic functionality. It is in the area of aesthetic functional-
ity that the law of trade dress appears to be in the process of
evolving towards a role in stimulating new product variations.
As late as 1984, the Second Circuit ruled that any element
- including an aesthetically appealing design - that is "an im-
portant ingredient in the salability of the goods" is functional in
a trademark sense and thus nonprotectable.4 The Second Cir-
cuit, however, repudiated this language the following year in
LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.43 LeSportsac had marketed a
line of women's bags of its own design. The bags were made of
parachute nylon and trimmed in carpet tape with matching cot-
ton-webbing straps. When K Mart, a discount department
store, copied the LeSportsac bags, LeSportsac sued successfully
42. Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725
F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1984). The "important ingredient" formulation of aesthetic
comes from Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). In the
latter case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that, because certain floral designs used by
Wallace on its china dishes were "an important ingredient in the commercial
success of the product," they were unprotectable, even though they had ac-
quired secondary meaning. Id at 343. The rationale for this ruling was the
furtherance of competition; in so ruling the court weighted more heavily com-
petition in manufacture than competition in creativity:
Of course, Tepco can also compete by developing designs even more
aesthetically satisfying, but the possibility that an alternative product
might be developed has never been considered a barrier to permitting
imitation competition in other types of cases. The law encourages
competition not only in creativeness but in economy of manufacture
and distribution as well.
Id. at 344.
43. 754 F.2d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1985).
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on a trade dress theory.44 K Mart failed in two functionality
defenses. First, K Mart's assertion that certain design features
such as the hollow rectangular zipper pull and the cotton tape
were functional in a utilitarian sense was rejected on the
ground that it was the design as a whole and not the individual
components that was protected.45 Second, K Mart asserted a
defense of aesthetic functionality, contending that "the particu-
lar configuration of features on its and LeSportsac's bags is
functional because it is 'an important ingredient in the commer-
cial success of the product' or the 'salability of the goods.' "46 In
response, the court drastically restricted the scope of the "im-
portant ingredient" criterion of functionality.
In LeSportsac, the Second Circuit's approach to trade dress
employed a version of the consumer motivation approach that
had proved so troubling when used by the Ninth Circuit to de-
termine genericity:
In deciding the question of functionality at trial, the factfinder will be
faced with answering the following- Are consumers likely to
purchase a LeSportsac bag rather than that of a competitor princi-
pally because they find LeSportsac's particular combination of design
features aesthetically pleasing, or will they buy principally because
the product features serve to identify or distinguish the goods as gen-
uine LeSportsac products? ... If the latter, the LeSportsac 'look' pri-
marily serves a legitimate trademark purpose - identifying the
source of the product - and should be eligible for protection even
though it is also an 'important ingredient' in the product's commercial
success.
47
In the quoted passage, the court preserved the "important
ingredient" formulation of functionality, but limited its applica-
tion by interposing a motivation test when an issue of aesthetic
functionality is raised. In the latter area, the "important ingre-
dient" criterion has been transformed from contributory cause
into primary cause: Under the new criterion, the aesthetic
component is nonfunctional unless it is the primary determi-
nant of consumer choice. Moreover, in other passages, the
court suggests that the "[t]rade dress associated with a product
that has accumulated goodwill, such as the LeSportsac line, will
almost always be 'an important ingredient' in the 'salability' of
the product."' ' In the court's view, the LeSportsac design could
be both protectable and an important ingredient of the com-
44. Id.
45. Id. at 76-77.
46. Id at 77.
47. I& at 78.
48. Id at 77.
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mercial success of the product, so long as the design identified
LeSportsac and consumers wanted the LeSportsac product.49
There is, of course, a circularity in the court's approach. A
popular design probably sold the LeSportsac bags initially. As
the design became fashionable, more buyers wished to purchase
the bag, some because they desired the assurance of quality
that the brand name helped to ensure, and some because they
liked the design. But after affording protection to LeSportsac
against copiers, there will be no alternatives available that in-
corporate the LeSportsac design. Shoppers will always use the
design as an indication of source, because there is only one
source that can provide the design.50 Although its words sug-
gest otherwise, the Second Circuit effectively has created a law
protecting designs as designs.
Other circuits have also given protection to product design
under the rapidly expanding trade dress doctrine. The Sev-
enth,51 Ninth,52 and Tenth53 Circuits have afforded protection
to product designs at least as broad as that accorded in the Sec-
ond Circuit. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit expressly has rejected
aesthetic functionality as a defense in trademark and trade
dress cases.M In affording protection to a fishing reel design,
the Tenth Circuit, in Brunswicc Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co.,55
adopted the following formulation of when a design should be
deemed functional and hence unprotectable: "The decision
should . . . rest on whether alternative appealing designs or
49. Ida at 78.
50. Consider the following variation of the Anti-Monopoly survey ques-
tion: "Do you want to purchase a bag of the LeSportsac design because that
design shows that it is made by LeSportsac, or do you want to purchase a bag
of the LeSportsac design and you don't much care who makes it?" The latter
alternative carries a sense of unreality once LeSportsac eliminates copies like
K Mart. When LeSportsac becomes the only source of the design, a buyer who
wants the design will always want to purchase the LeSportsac brand product.
51. Vaughn Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 350-51 (7th Cir.
1987).
52. Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516-17 (9th Cir.) (de-
sign of a clamp), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 202 (1989).
53. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987).
54. First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1382 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1987); Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 1983). If
indeed the Ninth Circuit has abandoned aesthetic functionality as these deci-
sions assert, its movement towards that position began in Vuitton Et Fils S.A.
v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1981), where it re-
jected the "important ingredient" test that it had formulated in Pagliero v.
Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
55. 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987).
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presentations of the product can be developed."'  Writing for
the Seventh Circuit a few years prior to Brunswick, Judge Pos-
ner, in W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene,57 took essentially the same ap-
proach. Judge Posner analyzed aesthetic functionality in terms
of the supply of attractive designs. For most products, there
are ordinarily many attractive design alternatives; only if the
possibilities are so limited as to impede effective competition by
rivals does a design become aesthetically functional. s These
tests are facially more protective than that adopted by the Sec-
ond Circuit. Under the tests of the Tenth and Seventh Circuits,
the protectability of the luggage design in the LeSportsac case
would not turn on an inquiry into consumer motivation (as the
Second Circuit would do), but into the question of whether
other designs could be crafted that are also attractive ones. Be-
cause it will almost always be the case that attractive alterna-
tive designs can be crafted for designs whose appeal is aesthetic,
the formulations of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits nearly
eliminate the aesthetic functionality defense.
The protection accorded product design under the trade
dress doctrine has expanded to the service industries, where no
identifiable "product" is being marketed. Here, protection is
accorded to matters less tangible. In Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's
B.R. Others, Inc.,59 the Ninth Circuit held that a restaurant
chain's "design concept" 60 and its "total visual image" of ser-
vice, including its "decor, menu, layout and style of service"61
could be protected under trade dress doctrine. Although the
court ruled that the issue of functionality would have to be
tried, the court's opinion is probably best read as having re-
jected the "important ingredient" test of aesthetic functionality.
It seems apparent that Fuddruckers's "total visual image" was
an "important ingredient" in its success. Therefore, the very
fact that the court devoted substantial- discussion to the pro-
tectability of Fuddruckers's "total visual image" suggests that
its approach to aesthetic functionality was similar to that em-
ployed by the Tenth Circuit in Brunswick: The issue turns on
whether rivals are capable of creating alternative visual images.
The court's statement that a feature is functional "if it is essen-
tial to the product's use or if it affects the cost or quality of the
56. Id-
57. 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
58. Id- at 343.
59. 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987).
60. Id at 839.
61. Id at 841.
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article"6 2 confirms this reading.
C. THE TRADE DRESS DOCTRINE AS ELCITING NEW PRODUCT
DESIGNS
The cases that accord protection to product design under a
trade dress rationale have enabled a growing number of busi-
ness firms to capture the economic benefits of their product de-
signs by excluding copiers; the Fuddruckers case suggests that
in service industries, firms also may be assisted in capturing the
full economic benefits of more amorphous service design con-
cepts. Because these expansive trade dress decisions are prece-
dents that assure others that they also will be accorded rights
against copiers, the decisions also are creating a legal structure
that encourages the development of creative product designs.
The courts that are expanding trade dress to include pro-
tection over product design are not focusing solely upon trade
dress as an indicator of source. Rather, they are consciously
crafting the law to encourage the development of creative and
pleasing designs. The Third Circuit, in Keene Corp. v. Paraflex
Indus.,6 3 declined to apply the "important ingredient" test ex-
pressly on the ground that it provides a disincentive to the de-
velopment of attractive designs:
The difficulty with accepting such a broad view of aesthetic function-
ality, which relates the doctrine to the commercial desirability of the
feature at issue without consideration of its utilitarian function, is
that it provides a disincentive for development of imaginative and at-
tractive design. The more appealing the design, the less protection it
would receive. As our ambience becomes more mechanized and ba-
nal, it would be unfortunate were we to discourage use of a spark of
originality which could transform an ordinary product into one of
grace.64
The Seventh Circuit cited this language with approval in W.T.
Rogers Co. v. Keene,65 and portions of it were quoted approv-
ingly by the Second Circuit in LeSportsac66 and by the Tenth
Circuit in Brunswick.67
It is at this point that trademark law is making a major
jump. The trade dress cases protect packaging designs on the
basis that the package design identifies the source. But when
product design is protected, more is being protected than mere
62. Id. at 842.
63. 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
64. Id- at 825.
65. 778 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir. 1985).
66. LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp. 754 F.2d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1985).
67. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987).
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source identification: The protection of product design prevents
rivals from copying the product design itself. When the design
is an important factor in marketing the product, the protection
of product design under the rubric of trademark law creates a
new substantive area of protection in which it performs func-
tions essentially similar to copyright, patent, and other substan-
tive areas of intellectual property protection. As noted above,
protection of product design creates incentives for sellers to de-
sign creatively and to capture the economic value of their
designs.68
D. THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF TRADEMARK AND TRADE
DRESS IN STIMULATING COMPETITION IN THE
CREATION OF NEW PRODUCT VARIATIONS
Part I explained how trademark law helps to stimulate
producers to develop new product variations. For many prod-
ucts, their full range of characteristics and their physical com-
position is not widely known by purchasers. Trademarks
enable purchasers (with limited information) to identify the
product variation which they believe most satisfies their needs
and to rely upon the source as an indicator of quality; in these
circumstances, trademarks stimulate innovations among produ-
cers in new combinations of product characteristics.
There is a class of product characteristics that is fully ap-
parent upon inspection. A detergent such as Proctor & Gam-
ble's Tide or a rival brand must be used in order to assess its
cleaning ability and other characteristics; a game board's iden-
tity with Parker Brothers's Monopoly, however, can be deter-
mined by inspection.
When a producer develops a product characteristic (such as
a new design) that is fully revealed by inspection, others are
likely to copy the design if it proves popular. Because purchas-
ers can determine by inspection whether a copy embodies the
original design, a trademark that merely identifies the prod-
uct's source will not assure the producer that it will capture
any substantial part of the design's economic value. The stimu-
lus engendered by trademark law to bring to market innovative
product variations thus would fail in the case of product designs
absent the protection afforded by trade dress doctrine.
68. See Note, Promotional Goods and the Functionality Doctrine. An Eco-
nomic Model of Trademarks, 63 TEx. L. REV. 639, 662 (1984) (arguing that the
aesthetic functionality doctrine impedes the widely recognized role of trade-
marks in lowering consumer search costs).
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E. THE DIRECTION OF TRADE DRESS DEVELOPMENT
1. An Increasing Scope for Design Protection
The logic of the case law suggests an increasing scope for
design protection as new classes of products are covered. So
long as in any industry there is - in Judge Posner's analytical
terms - no shortage of supply in alternative designs, design
protection engenders competition in bringing new product de-
signs to market. Competition in product design furthers the so-
cial interest in maximizing consumer choice. This furtherance
of consumer choice is compatible with the consumer interest in
price competition so long as no producer corners the market on
attractive designs. So long as there is no limit on potentially at-
tractive designs, no one producer will be able to exploit its own
design for more than the premium commanded by the relative
value of that design vis-A-vis all other designs in competition
with it: It is the premium commanded by a differentiated prod-
uct in competition with other products. Moreover, all produ-
cers are subject to the price competition from rivals offering
alternative designs and to those producers who choose to mar-
ket undifferentiated ("generic") products.
The direction of the cases is to accord broad design protec-
tion to a wide variety of articles that are not currently pro-
tected under the copyright and patent laws. Women's clothing
is a case in point. Under American law, designers have previ-
ously been unable to protect their particular designs from copi-
ers. Copyright law affords no. protection because it does not
protect designs that are an inseparable part of a utilitarian
product, such as an item of clothing.6 9 Neither does the design
patent law provide protection for clothing.70 Under the case
law, however, if the design of an item of clothing identifies its
source, then the design is at least potentially protectable. 71 As
the design becomes known to a growing public, it acquires sec-
ondary meaning. At that point, the design serves the function
of identifying source and, under the evolved trade dress doc-
trine, is protectable unless it is aesthetically functional.
69. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113 (1988).
70. See, e.g., Comment, Designer Law: Fashioning a Remedy for Design
Piracy, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 861, 868 (1983). Clothing designs rarely attain the
degree of novelty required for protection. Moreover, the lengthy application
process makes the design patent law unsuited for clothing designs that typi-
cally have a short commercial life expectancy.
71. See, e.g., Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977 (2d
Cir. 1987) (recognizing appropriateness of trade dress protection of clothing de-
signs so long as nonfunctional in the de jure trademark sense).
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Protection for women's clothing designs in the past was
probably deemed unavailable because the design was an "im-
portant ingredient" in the product's salability. 72 An increasing
number of circuits, however, have rejected or limited the
"important ingredient" approach.73  Increasingly, aesthetic
functionality means that alternative designs are either not
available or are significantly inferior. Because there are unlim-
ited numbers of potential clothing designs and many competing
designers (including numerous designers with international
reputations), it may be difficult to establish aesthetic function-
ality. The result is a growing potential for clothing designs to
be protected against copiers.
Moreover, some cases have indicated that the likelihood of
confusion against which the Lanham Act guards is not limited
to confusion by purchasers, but that the Act extends its protec-
tion against confusion by observers who may be confused as to
the source of the goods in the possession of a purchaser.74 Thus
a purchaser knowing that it is buying a copy of a Dior dress
may be observed by a third person who, observing the style,
concludes that the dress is a genuine Dior rather than a copy.
Extending protection against potential confusion by non-
purchasers, as in the example, combined with a broad protec-
tion for product designs further strengthens the power of a
designer to employ trademark law as a new species of design
protection.
Automobile designs should also receive increasing protec-
tion under the trade dress doctrine. Like clothing, automobile
designs are not protectable under the copyright laws because an
automobile design is inseparable from the vehicle itself, which
is a useful object. Designs resulting from air resistance analysis
are functional in a utilitarian sense and will not be protectable.
Matters of pure style, however, unconnected with function -
where the number of alternative designs is not inherently lim-
ited - will be potentially protectable. The courts have already
protected some features of automobile design.75
72. See Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952)
(formulating the "important ingredient" test).
73. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
74. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987);
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872-73 (2d
Cir. 1986); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir.
1980).
75. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili e Corse v. Roberts, 739
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2. Protection for Imprecisely Defined Images or Concepts
The logic of the case law suggests a growing coverage for
an aggregate of service element, such as that asserted by Fud-
druckers as it sought protection for "the total visual image of
its restaurant service." 76 Here, the aggregation of separate ele-
ments in a particular configuration constitutes the trade dress.
As in the product design cases previously discussed, the trade
dress here is not packaging, but rather a constituent part of
that which is being purchased. Restaurant customers buy more
than the food; they buy ambience and atmosphere. It is the lat-
ter over which Fuddruckers sought protection. A similar con-
figuration of individual elements formed the basis of a claim for
protection over a product variation in Hartford House, Ltd. v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc.77 In that case, the Tenth Circuit pro-
tected against imitation "the overall appearance or look" of a
line of emotional non-occasion greeting cards.78 As the Fud-
druckers approach would apparently extend protection broadly
to the configuration of service elements, so the Hartford House
approach would expand protection to the configuration of con-
stituent elements in a product's appearance and so would po-
tentially extend protection beyond that which is conventionally
considered as design.
3. Limits on Design Protection
a. Normal Case Law Development
Because Fuddruckers and Hartford House carry out the
logic of the trade dress cases to their ultimate conclusion, they
raise the question of when the scope of protection extended
ceases to be justified under existing rationales. The matters
sought to be protected in these cases are visible almost in their
entirety to purchasers. Design, therefore, plays little or no role
here in quality assurance by identifying source for a product or
service whose entire characteristics are not apparent by inspec-
tion. Moreover, the service and product are consumed in one
use: There is no latent product-durability issue for which a
source indication provides assurance. Nor in these cases is
there a great need to employ protection as a device to evoke
F. Supp. 1138, 1143-44 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (protecting exterior shapes and
features).
76. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cii.
1987).
77. 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
78. Id. at 1275.
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creative forms of service or product designs, because the service
and product variations are kinds which the market itself would
be likely to evoke. On the basis of considerations like these,
the courts are likely to draw limits to the trade dress protec-
tion. Where precisely these limits will ultimately fall cannot, of
course, be predicted with accuracy. Their general outlines are
clear: The limits of protection will lie where the source identi-
fication role is weak, the kinds of innovation stimulated are
perceived as trivial, or the innovation role itself appears to be
generated by normal market rivalry without need of stimulus
through protection.
b. Constitutional Limitations
The potential expansiveness of the trade dress doctrine is
likely to be partially contained by the Sears/Compco doctrine79
as most recently articulated in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc.8 0 Under these decisions, states may not ex-
tend protection to designs that would conflict with the policies
contained in the federal patent and copyright laws. Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Bonito Boats reaches the protection of
design through the trade dress doctrine. Observing that the
trade dress doctrine extends protection to designs that are also
potentially protectable under federal design patents,8 ' she
nonetheless indicated that state trade dress doctrine was not
preempted insofar as it was based upon a source-indication ra-
tionale.82 Other language in her opinion suggests that state
trade dress protection based upon a rationale of protecting pro-
ducers as an incentive to product or service innovation is insup-
portable.8 3 Justice O'Connor, however, did not directly address
the validity of state laws protecting designs where those laws
are based upon both a source-indication rationale as well as an
79. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
80. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). In Bonito Boats, the Court invalidated a Florida
"plug molding" statute that sought to protect designs against copying by means
of direct molding. The defendant had made a mold of a boat hull designed by
the plaintiff. Id at 145. The Court viewed the protection extended by the
Florida statute as approaching too closely the kind of protection afforded by
federal patent law. Id, at 157. Products, processes and designs not protected
by federal patent law can be freely duplicated, said Justice O'Connor for the
Court, and Florida's attempt to prohibit duplication, even limited to prohibi-
tion of the plug molding technique, was preempted. Id at 168.
81. Id at 154.
82. Id at 156.
83. Id. at 157.
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incentive-to-innovation rationale. Moreover, because the issue
before the Court was the scope of federal preemption of state
law, she did not address the extent to which section 43 of the
Lanham Act provides a federal basis for design protection
under a trade dress rubric.84
CONCLUSION
Examined in the light of information scarcity, the trade
mark and trade dress doctrines perform different and comple-
mentary roles. Trade (and service) marks perform an essential
role in an information-scarce world by identifying the source of
products and services. Source identification is important to a
purchaser who lacks complete knowledge about the product
and is relying upon the source as a guarantee of quality. In this
roundabout way, a trademark conveys information about the
product itself. This role is especially important in stimulating
new product variations: By identifying simultaneously a prod-
uct variation and its source, purchasers are able to maximize
their informational input about a combination of product char-
acteristics and suppliers are encouraged to provide product va-
riety. The approach to genericity pursued by the Ninth Circuit
in the Anti-MonopoZy case threatened to impede this latter as-
pect of trademark law.
The abundant variety of product characteristics available to
consumers in an advanced society is a result of competition in
product variations. This competition is stimulated when each
seller can identify its own particular package of characteristics
with a logo or other symbol. Although buyers will not gener-
ally possess complete knowledge about any of the products,
they are able to acquire increasing amounts of knowledge over
time as a result of their experience with the packages of partic-
ular sellers or their reputations. Trademarks enable them to
identify the product packages about which they know the most
and to rely upon the reputation of the source as insurance
against their ignorance. In this world of competition in product
variations, trademarks engender incentives among producers to
devise ever more pleasing packages of product characteristics
and to guard against quality erosion.
In its protection of product design and image, trade dress
84. See, e.g., W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985)
(discussing alternative views of section 43: Whether it merely provides a fed-
eral remedy for unfair competition under state law or whether it creates a fed-
eral substantive law of unfair competition).
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protects that which is fully known and which constitutes part
of the product itself. The protected design, to be sure, identifies
the source, but it is this protection of product characteristics
that makes trade dress protection controversial. The product
characteristics protected by trade dress are, like design, open
and unconcealed. Information scarcity has a limited role here,
because it is not the unknown part of the product or service to
which trade dress relates. For products whose full characteris-
tics are not apparent upon inspection, design protection identi-
fies the source and thereby provides purchasers an assurance of
quality for the unknown part of the product. For products
whose entire range of characteristics are apparent upon inspec-
tion, however, trade dress protection of design does not provide
any assurance of quality. In both cases, however, trade dress
law, like trademark law, stimulates product variation. Trade
dress law performs this role by allowing producers to stake out
particular variations as their own (as Brunswick staked out the
diamond shaped fishing reel design), thereby providing them
with incentives to expend resources necessary to bring creative
and attractive product designs to market.
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